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Victor Hugo once wrote that there is nothing as powerful in 
the world as an idea whose time has come. I wish to consider 
with you one such idea. 
Some of us who have been around medicine for some time 
are developing mixed feelings about our profession. Around 
major medical centers, one cannot but share in the excitement 
that scintillates from the laboratories and clinics whose ever-
novel gadgetry and techniques offer increasing prospects of 
the control of many of man's ancient physical foes. It is 
awesome to contemplate the pace with which this is taking 
place. It is ever more difficult even to be aware of everything 
that is tumbling out onto the stage of our medical lives, let 
alone develop the skills for utilizing that knowledge in the 
day-to-day care of patients. And so by necessity specialties 
divide like cells into subspecialties and they in turn into sub-
sub specialties and into metaspecialties, and sometimes it is 
hard not to experience a touch of anxiety over whether the 
growing organism is exceeding its controls like some vast 
Andromeda strain. 
And so there is mingled with the excitement a certain 
foreboding. There is also nostalgia and a sense of loss. It is 
hard sometimes to contemplate the gleaming stainless steel, 
polyethylene, and chrome of the present without wondering 
whether the golden age of medicine may have already slipped 
through our fingers into the past-a golden age when the 
doctor was the most beloved and respected professional in our 
society; when his was the role little boys and little girls could 
dream about playing "when they grew up"; when he was more 
a member of the family than a businessman or ivory tower 
scientist; a man trusted to do his best for you even ifhe wasn't 
God. In retrospect, he could have benefited from a bit more 
of science. He sometimes did some pretty "dumb" things to 
people medically, but he also did some wonderfully humane 
things and we are all the worse for his passing. 
What happened? A lot of things. The world changed. 
People changed. The nostalgia is also one for a golden age of 
patients. Remember, you graybeards, when patients were 
loyal year after year-even generation after generation? But 
mobility has changed all of that. Who now can speak of 
"generation after generation" or even "year after year?" All 
kinds of people who used to live together in reasonaby stable 
configurations are now racing around rootless in every direc-
tion. We have become what Alvin Toffler called "citizens of 
the age of transience." 
Ours is an age of fantastic mobility. According to 
Buckminster Fuller, the typical American of 1914 averaged 
about 1,640 miles per year of total travel counting 1,300 miles 
of just plain everyday walking to and fro; to the kitchen, to the 
bathroom (or outhouse), out to the lawn to pick up the paper, 
around the shop, to the store. This meant he traveled only 
about 350 miles per year with the aid of a horse or mechanical 
contrivance. In his lifetime he would travel about 88,560 
miles. By contrast the present American covers some ten to 
twenty thousand miles per year. By the time he dies, he will 
have traveled between three and four million miles-more 
than thirty times the total of his 1914 counterpart. 
In a typical year nearly thirty-seven million Americans (not 
counting children under one year) change their place of 
residence. In every year since 1948, one out of five Americans 
changed his address. In seventy major American cities the 
average residence is less than four years. For literally thou-
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sands of Americans, home has become "where you find it." 
This sense of the transitory is further enhanced by the 
increasing brevity of our encounters with other people. We 
used to be able to depend upon certain social configurations 
as more or less enduring-the family, for example. The rising 
divorce rate and various family experiments have seriously 
threatened this continuity. One's neighborhood friends; 
even service people in the community, the grocer, the mail-
man, the barber, the physician, could once be counted on year 
after year-but now we briefly touch people, quickly, super-
ficially, then hurry on. 
In the process of all this change there has occurred a shift in 
the image many physicians have of their roles. Let me put it 
in the framework of a concept of "agency." 
Time was when a physician thought of himself or herself as 
being the patient's "agent" -not in the sense of merely 
becoming a manipulated servant of patient wants and whims. 
Rather, the physician saw himself or herself as the agent of the 
patient's best interests-even if patients didn't always per-
ceive what those interests were. In short, his care was patient-
centered. 
This sense of patient-agency now appears to be changing. 
From being agent to the patient's highest interests, the 
physician has become to a large extent, I'm afraid, agent to 
himself. The patient-healing motive has largely been re-
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placed by an income motive and physician's services have 
become geared to turning a profit-based on whatever the 
market will bear-and in the process the profession bids fair 
to become a business just like any other business. Something 
has been lost in transition. 
And now with resulting skyrocketing medical costs far 
outstripping the national rate of inflation, a third concept of 
agency is about to be thrust upon us: the physician as an agent 
of the government. The kids are already starting to dream 
other dreams. 
There is probably no way to counter the social forces that 
have brought us to this state of affairs. As population increases 
and the social structure becomes ever more complicated, it 
appears almost inevitable that government is going to become 
bigger, more centralized-and more meddlesome. Nor is 
there likelihood that in the very near future we are to become 
less mobile as a people. Probably just the opposite, unless we 
suddenly run out of gasoline, which seems to be down the 
road apiece. 
The question is, "Is there anything we can do about these 
trends?" In searching for the answer to this question, we 
would do well to reexamine some underlying assumptions. It 
is time to develop not only a science of medicine or an ethic 
of medicine but a theology of medicine. 
The phrase "theology of medicine" suggests a theological 
point of departure from which medicine as a clinical disci pline 
may proceed to its task. As I surveyed the options, I first 
thought of eschatology as that point because it has to do with 
"finishing the work." Next I selected soteriology, the doc-
trine of salvation. There is a certain logic to that choice since 
medicine has to do with healing, making persons whole, 
"binding up the broken." The word "salvation" derives from 
the Latin, salvus, from which we also r~-ceive our word salve. 
To save is to salve, and heal and whole have a common 
etymology. 
But the more I thought about it, the more I realized that the 
doctrine of salvation itself is a subset of a higher concept, the 
doctrine of creation. To be saved is to experience recreation. 
"Create in me a clean heart," cried the Psalmist, and Paul 
notes that in Christ I may become a "new creature." 
And so I have chosen to base my theology of medicine on 
the doctrine of creation. I do not wish to elaborate what this 
means in extensive detail, but I will present a few of the 
implications of this choice. The doctrine of creation posits in 
main outline a Creator, temporally and logically prior to every 
creature. It thus stands in opposition to every attempt to grant 
creaturely ultimacy. In our present terms, to be an agent of 
the Creator is to place into subservience every other kind of 
agency, patient, self or institution. 
Consider patient-agency, for example. Creator-agency equi ps 
one to deal lovingly with all patients in spite of their un-
loveworthy characteristics or the brevity of one's contacts 
with them. The love-as-principle derived from Creator-
agency does not require that the objects of healing or love be 
loveworthy or that they even be our friends. 
Zama Cunningham described an elderly woman she cared 
for as a patient as "a terrible old creature, vain and cruel." 
When asked why she took care of her all of those years, she 
replied, "She needed someone all the more just because she 
was vain and cruel. Her loneliness and poverty weren't any 
the less for that. If you love people you have to take care of 
Continued on page 5 
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Futile therap'y was recently defined by Lawrence 
Schneiderman, Nancy Jecker, and Albert Jonsen of the Uni-
versity of Washington as a therapy "that is predictably or 
empirically very unlikely to achieve the goal for which the 
therapy is given, though it is possible and plausible for the 
therapy to achieve the goal."(1) They go on to say, "In 
judging futility, physicians must distinguish between an effect 
which is limited to some part of the patient's body, and a benefit 
which appreciably improves the person as a whole. Treat-
ment that fails to provide the latter is futile." They also 
include in their definition of futility "therapy that merely 
preserves permanent unconsciousness, that is the persistent 
vegetative state." Thus these authors emphasize values in 
their concept of "futility" by speaking of the goal of therapy, 
by distinguishing a benefit from an effect, and by implying 
their view of life without consciousness. 
The term "futile," however, is too often misunderstood to 
be simply a value-free probability statement. For example, I 
have heard statements of these same authors taken out of 
context: "When physicians conclude that in the last 100 cases 
the medical treatment is useless, they should regard that 
treatment as futile"; and "physicians can judge a treatment to 
be futile, and are entitled to withhold a procedure on this 
basis. Physicians need not obtain consent from patients or 
family members."(1) Similarly, in an earlier paper John 
Lantos and his colleagues of the Center for Clinical Medical 
Ethics at the University of Chicago wrote, "Futile therapy is 
merely the end of the spectrum of therapies with very low 
efficacy. A physician is under no obligation to offer, or even 
discuss, futile therapies."(2) 
However, Lantos and colleagues bring us back to values or 
goals: A decision to withhold therapy that is deemed futile, 
like all treatment choices, must follow (first) judgment about 
the chance of success of the therapy, and (second) consider-
ation of the patient's goals for therapy." Thus they raise yet 
another extremely important component of the concept of 
"futility": the need to know the patient's as well as the 
physician's goals for therapy in order to properly judge futility. 
Even when one appreciates the value-dependency of the 
*Ronald B. Miller, M.D., is Clinical Professor of Medicine 
and Director of The Program in Medical Ethics, University 
of California, Irvine 
concept of "futility," problems remain. Forexample, Virginia 
Warren, a Professor of Philosophy at Chapman College in 
California, points out, "The use of the word 'futile' begs the 
question: that is, the word already has the conclusion within 
it."(3) Perhaps a better term is "inappropriate" therapy, but 
whichever term one uses, it is crucial that one judge both the 
goal of therapy and the probability of success of the therapy. 
Most would agree that the goal of therapy ought to be seen 
from the viewpoint of the informed patient, and some would 
say that the goal of therapy should be evaluated from the 
physician's perspective as well. With regard to the probability 
of success of the therapy, most would rely upon the physician 
for that judgment, perhaps confirmed by the judgment of a 
consultant physician. 
What are the implications of a judgment of futility? The 
first level of implication of a judgment of futility is that the 
physician or institution is not obliged to offer a treatment that 
would be futile. In the recent Annals paper,(1) that would 
mean no success in the last 100 similar cases, or less than a two 
percent chance of success. The next level of implication of a 
judgment of futility is that the physician or institution may 
withhold or withdraw therapy, and we are all familiar with the 
fact that ethically it is felt there is no difference between 
withholding or withdrawing therapy. Although withdrawing 
is vastly more difficult psychologically for health-care workers 
than withholding, it is ethically problematic for one to be 
unwilling to withdraw therapy once instituted, since that 
precludes a therapeutic trial. It forces the patient to decide in 
advance, without trying the therapy, whether he would like it 
or not, and to accept or refuse it, based on hunch or inadequate 
information. The next level of implication of a judgment of 
futility I find particularly problematic: that such a judgment 
implies the physician is not obliged to discuss the possible 
therapy with the patient. My argument that patients should 
be informed is based on the belief that they have the right to 
seek treatment from another physician or from another insti-
tution if the treatment they would wish to try is judged to be 
futile. On the other hand, this argument could be extended 
to absurdity, requiring a physician to review a litany of inef-
fective treatments every time a treatment decision were to be 
made. The final level of implication of a judgment of futility 
is that the physician or institution is obliged to withhold or 
withdraw therapy irrespective of the patient's wishes. And 
this leads us to appreciation of the importance of shared 
3 
decision-making; that is, the importance of the views of both 
patients and physicians. 
The table in Figure 1 compares what the patient wants with 
what the physician judges to be effective or futile. In the 
upper left-hand corner, when the patient wants a treatment 
which the physician judges effective, of course the treatment 
is provided. And in the bottom right-hand corner, when the 
patient does not wish a treatment, and the physician judges 
the treatment would be futile anyway, of course one does not 
treat. The other two circumstances are problematic. In the 
upper right-hand corner, when a patient does not wish therapy 
but the physician judges it to be effective, sometimes the 
. physician may force treatment, even by going to court. This 
is particularly common in neonatology and in the care of 
children when the surrogate refusal of the therapy is based 
upon the parent's values which are not shared by all of society, 
for example a Jehovah Witness parent's refusal of blood 
transfusion for a child who would die without it, or a Christian 
Science refusal of treatment. In the bottom left-hand corner 
is the circumstance in which the patient wants treatment and 
the physician judges it to be futile. I believe the basis for such 
decision is commonly the strength of conviction of patient 
and physician, the certainty of prognosis, and non-medical 
. considerations such as cost. Even when the chance of success 
is low, if the cost is also low (whether the cost is economic or 
risk), the physician will often allow the patient to have his way 
and not rarely the patient proves correct. 
In Figure 2 the utility of therapy (that is the quantity of 
benefit if the therapy is successful) is compared with the 
probability of success of the therapy. In the upper left-hand 
corner, when both are high, of course, one treats. Conversely, 
in the bottom right-hand corner, when both are low, one does 
not treat. The other two circumstances are again problematic, 
and influenced by non-medical factors as well as by medical 
factors. With regard to the latter, the medical factors, in the 
upper right-hand corner when the benefit to be achieved is 
relatively small but the probability of achieving that benefit 
is high, one probably would treat. Similarly in the lower left-
hand corner, when the benefit to be achieved is great even 
though the probability of achieving it is small, once again, 
probably one would treat. 
Additional serious concerns about the concept of futility are 
that the determination of futility may hide physician discre-
tion or paternalism, may disguise social prejudice, or may 
mask a resource allocation decision in the guise of a medical 
judgment. 
I will attempt to make these abstract comments about 
futility concrete by applying them to the circumstance of 
Figure 1 
Patient wants Rx 
Rx 
Treat Effective 
Rx Sometimes treat, 
Futile Sometimes don't 
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cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Leslie Blackhall of Boston 
University wrote a landmark paper(4) concerning futility in 
response to a poignant patient's plight and to increasing 
evidence in the medical literature of the strikingly lower 
success rate of cardiopulmonary resuscitation than originally 
reported by Kouwenhoven(S) who had observed 70 percent 
long-term survival following dosed-chest cardiac massage. 
Blackhall stated, "Infrequently discussed is the situation in 
which a patient wants CPR but the physician believes that it 
is contraindicated. In these cases, patients almost invariably 
remain full code." She went on to say, "Incases in which CPR 
has been shown to be of no benefit, it should not be consid-
ered an alternative and should not be presented to the patient 
as such,'" that is, as a viable alternative. In such cases 
physicians could write, "This patient has a condition for 
which CPR has been shown not to be effective. In case of 
cardiopulmonary arrest, CPR should not be performed." 
In a recent paper in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association(6), Tomlinson and Brody spoke of the same sortof 
case, one where CPR would be futile. They said, "No 
reasonable person would pursue the low probability or quality 
of survival that CPR offers in the kind of case at hand. This is 
a social judgment of reasonableness," not an individual one. 
Social judgments about the range and rational conception of 
the good set the boundaries within which individual, instru-
mental rationality can competently operate." 
Indeed, in Tomlinson's and Brody's earlier paper in the 
New EnglandJournal of Medicine(7), (but a later paper than that 
of Blackhall) they discussed three types ofDNR, the first the 
Blackhall type. This is, when the rationale for a DNR order 
is that the patient cannot medically benefit, the patient's 
values are irrelevant, and there is no implication of the DNR 
order for any other medical treatment. In the second type of 
DNR, where the rationale is a poor quality of life after CPR, 
the patient's values are dearly relevant, but this type ofDNR 
has again no implication for other treatment. In the third type 
of DNR order, that where the rationale is a poor quality oflife 
before CPR, obviously again the patient's values are relevant 
and fundamental to the decision for the DNR, but further-
more this rationale has substantial implication for other treat-
ment, which of course must be discussed with the patient or 
his surrogate and appropriately limited. 
Let me return to the first issue, that of a DNR order when 
no medical benefit of CPR is perceived. Although Tomlinson 
and Brody point out that such a judgment can be made 
irrespective of the patient's values, I believe this is true only 
when one is absolutely confident that CPR would not restore 
life, for even brief restoration of life may be appropriate from 
Patient does not wants Rx 
Sometimes treat (even go 
to court); Often don't treat 
Don't treat 
Figure 2 
Utility of Therapy 
. High 
Probability High Treat 
of 
Success: 
Low Probably treat 
the patient's point of view, if for example even another few 
hours of life might allow him to visit with a relative coming 
from out of town to his deathbed. I have maintained, as has 
Stuart Youngner(8), that the physician does have an obliga-
tion to at least inform the patient that he does not intend CPR 
should a cardiopulmonary arrest occur. He does not necessar-
ily have to ask the patient for this permission, but he needs at 
least to inform the patient so that if the patient believes the 
judgment is incorrect he can try to so persuade the physician. 
Once again, then, we are returning to the matter of the goals 
of therapy and the possibility that the patient's goals may be 
somewhat different from the physician's. 
Tomlinson and Brody in their recent paper state, "The 
mixed messages inherent in requesting patient consent to 
withhold futile therapy serve to undermine rather than to 
enhance autonomous choice."(6) Indeed, I agree with this, 
but I do not believe it is equally true that informing the 
patient that one is going to withhold futile therapy necessarily 
undermines autonomous choice of the patient. 
Indeed, I believe (though not all who have read their paper 
focused on it) Tomlinson and Brody wisely went on to say, 
"Our proposal would eliminate not discussion, but only the 
use of the consent process as the context for discussion. An 
ethically confused and misleading discussion focused on 
consent would be replaced by more honest and appropriate 
discussion focused on enhancing the patient's understanding 
of the limits of medical intervention." (6) They further state, 
"Although physicians should not offer futile resuscitation, in 
most cases they should inform the patient or family that 
resuscitation would be futile and should not be attempted, 
explaining the medical facts that support that decision." 
Finally, I wish to briefly relate the concept of futility to the 
just allocation of resources. "Although care that is futile is also 
not "cost-worthy," care that is not cost-worthy relative to 
other uses of medical resources may still offer benefits to the 
patient and so not be futile." (6) The Seattle group also states, 
"Our notion of futility does not arise from considerations of 
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the unattractive ones too." 
Being an agent of God makes it possible also to be an agent 
for even unattractive patients. It may in fact be the only 
possibility. Certainly that may be the case with those patients 
whose contacts with us are so brief that we and they remain 
strangers. To love in principle as an agent of God may be the 
only basis for my being the stranger's agent. And of course 
being thus able to remain patient-oriented protects me from 
Low 
Probably treat 
Don't treat 
scarce resources. Arguments for limiting treatments on grounds 
of resource allocation should proceed by an entirely different 
route, and with great caution, in our open system of medical 
care."(1) 
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those other agency dominations which follow when patient-
agency is lost-that is, self-agency or government-agency. 
Only on this basis will the physician of the future avoid 
burying his patients in the burgeoning morass of inevitable 
government red tape. 
The doctrine of creation in which the creature is dependent 
upon the Creator for his total existence provides a barrier to 
that self-sufficiency which is the essence of self-agency. If 
Continued on page 6 
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one lives out one's life with a pervasive sense of stewardship 
over all one has received from the Creator and employs his 
gifts as one accountable to God, there is less possibility that 
they will be turned in upon the self. Self-sufficiency is the 
primal sin. It is the attempt to be God. Only the Creator is 
self-sufficient-by definition. It was Lucifer's sin in heaven 
and it was the temptation in the garden-and it is the growing 
sin of physicians as they multiply their wizardry and gadgets. 
We all know of course that in the ordinary practice of 
medicine, members of our profession are frequently con-
fronted with decisions that might more properly be placed in 
the hands of someone all-knowing. But alas, the Omniscient 
One has placed them in ours. We are also at times given power 
over life that might seem more appropriate to the Omnipotent 
One. But there is no escape. Use it we must. There is no one 
else to whom to turn. So we sometimes seem to be playing 
God-and it is only a short step from playing God to develop-
ing illusions about being God. To recall that we are creatures 
can help us to carry such awesome responsibility with a 
measure of humility. 
It can also prevent us from surrendering our souls to other 
creature-gods beyond ourselves. There may be no escaping 
the increasing interference of governmental power in our 
lives-and institutional power at all levels-but never must 
such power be allowed to steal our souls, seal our lips, or sear 
our consciences. Tangled up in red tape and institutional 
directives we may be, but we stand responsibly before a 
Creator Who is higher than any human structure. "Thou shalt 
have no other Gods before me" is not a dead command. No 
human institution must be allowed to come between me and 
Dear Friends: 
my carrying out my God-given task of acting for the good of 
my patients. 
Another implication of the doctrine of creation is the man-
ner in which such a doctrine affirms the material world. When 
God finished His work in the Genesis account, it is written 
that He said of it, "It is very good." This included all that He 
had made. That first Sabbath was a celebration of the 
goodness of all of the creation-including man. Material 
substance was good; the woods, the sky, animal life, man-
even man's social order and functions-were pronounced 
good. How often has the creature forgotten that truth as he 
has devalued himself and polluted his environment! 
Some thinkers even demeaned those professions whose 
primary concern was that creation, including man's body. 
Those celebrated Roman baths which were a hallmark of 
Roman civilization were destroyed and repressed by Chris-
tian Rome as undue pampering of the body. The body was 
always suspect by such Christians. The baths survived for a 
time in the Islamic world, where the body was conceived of 
differently-along, interestingly enough, with about all the 
scientific medicine the world had to offer during that period. 
The Christian emperor Justinian I closed down the medical 
schools at Athens and Alexandria in the fifth century. To 
many of his contemporaries, medicine was rejected as a 
materialistic use of drugs and potions and therapies instead of 
mystical things like prayers and religious incantations. Tatian 
lodged a protest against the invasion of science. He regarded 
it as not becoming to ascribe to matter the relief of the sick. 
Monasticism carried this notion to its logical conclusion in its 
denying of the body as a means to spiritual excellence. St. 
Continued on page 8 
I recently celebrated the 10th anniversary of my 7th birthday. Usually 3 score and 1 0 seems to wind life up formany septugenarians. 
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Not so for this one. I feel wound up for life. One of the things that really excites me is the work of the faculty that make up our Center 
for Christian Bioethics. I am constantly amazed at how much our ethicists do, and at the many dreams they have and shore. 
I would like to thank you for your interest, prayers and for the generous gifts that many of you hove mode. It is your involvement 
that makes our work at the Center possible. One of our dreams is to build our endowment up to a full $1 ,000,000 by the year 2000. 
Our endowment is now at over $632,000. We would like to be close to the $700,000 mark by June 30, 1992. 
I think you know what's coming next. Yes, I would like to ask for your financial gift. Please make the largest possible gift that you 
can to assist us in building our endowment. If the options we provide in the enclosed return envelope are not ambitious enough, please 
set our sights higher. As you well know, endowments and their proceeds enable the Center to maintain and extend its activities without 
hoving to depend strictly on operating support. 
Our God is good to us. We thank Him for this. You are with us too. Thank you for your interest and for your generous gift. 
Shaluha, 
~o. ..... Qv~. 
Wil Alexander, 
Dean, Faculty of Religion 
Chairperson, Center for Christian Bioethics 
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Hildegard wrote, "God rarely dwells in a healthy body," a 
view, of course, tinged by a Gnostic-Manichean concept of 
matter (and the body) as degenerate and evil. Such attitudes 
forced scientific medicine to develop largely outside of the 
church. 
But if the body is God's creation and good, although it may 
sometimes need assistance because some things have gone 
awry in God's creation, quite another philosophy oftherapeu-
tics emerges. There is an inherent "wisdom" in the body 
placed there by the Creator. If the body for one reason or 
another fails to live up to the Creator's design, it may require 
assistance; but the assistance is only to the end that the body 
may fulfill the Creator's intention. It is the role of the 
physician who believes in the creation to cooperate with the 
body's own "wisdom" -not merely to manipulate it accord-
ing to his own. 
Remember Ambrose Pare's statement of some 300 years 
ago, "I dress the wound, God heals it"? This is, I think, the 
sense of Ellen White's often-repeated expression, "natural 
remedy." A "natural remedy" should be understood as any 
remedy that cooperates with and assists nature in its God-
given physiologic process-anything whatever, whether it 
comes off a bush, out of a water tap, or an electric light socket, 
or in a pill, an infusion bottle, from a machine, or involving the 
skilled application of a scalpel. Does it respect the "wisdom" 
of the body? That is the question. The doctrine of creation 
prescribes that it must. (Obviously not all remedies are 
unmixedly "natural" in this sense. There are often unwanted 
side effects, but the principle still holds. A physician condi-
tioned by respect for the body will choose agents according to 
their greatest positive and least negative affects-while search-
ing for better ones.) 
Last but not least, a belief in the doctrine of creation will 
also include that secondarysubs.et-re-creation-the subject 
of soteriology. Anyone who takes creation seriously will also 
be dedicated to the total restoration of man as nearly as 
possible to the Creator's ideal. Since humanity's fall included 
all of its dimensions-so must humanity's healing. 
I submit that if our profession is going to retain those 
qualities that have made it so powerful a force for good in the 
world, and made it so exciting and appealing to us in those 
idealistic days of our youth, as it undergoes agency transition 
it must discover its true role as an agency of the divine Creator. 
The concept of the physician as the Creator's agent pro-
vides for a truly patient-centered medicine in a world in 
transition. It may also provide the physician with an escape 
from functioning as profit-oriented agents of self-centeredness, 
or of finally becoming merely the agents of impersonal gov-
ernmental bureaucracy. 
The physician as an agent of the Divine Creator is an idea 
whose time not only has come but is long overdue .• 
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